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to determine that question, and the removal of the cause to that
tribunal is not a denial of justice.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and all proceedings sub-
sequent to the filing of the petition are set aside, and the court is
directed to pass upon the sufficiency of any bond that may bd
offered under the law of Congress, and if such bond be approved
to proceed no further in the-case.
.ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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SUPREME COURT OF MASSAOHUSETTS.
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.4
SUPREME COURT OP NEW YORK.5
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT'.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
.Must be executed.-An agreement or accord which is to operate as a
satisfaction of an existing liability, must, before it can have that effect,
be fully executed: Bragg v. Pierce, 53 M2e.
It- is merely executory, so long as by its terms something remains to
be done in the future: Id.
ADMISSIONS.
Of a Party-/ When concluive against him.-.The adissions'of a
party, whether of law or of fact, which have been acted upon by another,
are conclusive against the party -making them, as between him and the
person whose conduct he has influenced. And this, whether the admis-
sions are made in express language to the person himself, or are implied
from the open and general conduct of the party : Calanan v. MClure,
Executor, &c., 47 Barb.
Tiat a Claim is still open fo Settlement.-In the winter or spring
of 1861, a creditor presente.d an account against an estate to the execu-
tor, which was -ejected by the latter, on the 15th of March. An offer
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 4 of his Reports.
S From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Me. Rep.
s From Charles Allen, Esq. ; to appear in Vol. 12 of his Reports.
4 From T. N. McCarter, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 2 of his Reports.
r, From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in Vol. 47 of his Reports.
g From W. G. Veazie, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 39 Vt. Rep.
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of a given sum was made, by the attorneys of the executor, to com-
promise the claim, which was refused by the creditor. In April another
account, embracing some additional items, was presented to the execu-
tor, and an offer made, by the creditor, to settle it for fifty cents on the
dollar. The executor then promised to see his attorney, and to let the
creditor know what he would do about it. The creditor called upon the
executor repeatedly for his answer, and the usual excuse was that
the executor had either forgotten to see his attorney, or that the latter
was out of town. Finally, in October, after six months from the first
rejection of the account had elapsed, the executor refused to pay the
account, or to consent to refer it. -Held, that the negotiations which
were thus kept alive were an admission by the executor that the matter
was still open for settlement, and that the first rejection was not con-
sidered as final and conclusive, but was waived and abandoned: Id.
Reld, also, that, under the circumstances, the claim was not barred
by the Statute of Limitations until six months after its final rejection,
in October: ld.
AGENT.
Personal Liability-Partnership.-The duty is upon the agent, if he
would avoid personal liability, to disclose his agency-not upon others
to discover it. If he fails to disclose it and deals with persons unaware
of it, he must answer to them-personally for the debts he contracts:
Baldwin v. Leonard, 39 Vt.
MHere knowledge of the agency by one partner is not constructively
knowledge by the firm; and -if the agent, after communicating informa-
tion of his agency to one partner, buys the goods in the absence of that
partner, and without any participation in the transaction by that partner,
of another member of the firm, who is unaware of the agency, such
agent will be personally liable to the firm unless he discloses his agency
to the partner with whom he trades: .d.
R., H., and E. were partners and owned some hay," L. asked R. if
they had any hay to sell, and told him he was buying as an agent of K.
R. said he was not prepared to contract for the hay then. In fact, it was
not at that time all cut. L. said he would call again. Four weeks
after this he called and bought the hay of H., in R.'s absence and with-
out his knowledge. L. did not disclose his agency to H. Held, that
the conversation between L. and R. was no part of any negotiation, and
the agent was personally liable to the firm to pay for the hay he bought,
although he, in fact, bought it for K.: Id.
Ratification of unauthorized Acts.-:-Ratification of the unauthorized
acts of one who assumes to be an agent, in order to render them bind-
ing on the principal, must have been made with full knowledge of all
material facts; and ignorance of such facts, whether it arises from want
of inquiry by the principal, and neglect to ascertain the facts, or from
other causes, will render an alleged ratification ineffectual and invalid:
Combs v. &ott, 12 Allen.
AGREEMEiNT.
For the Sale of Lands, signed by Vendee only.-An agreement for
the sale and purchase of lands, signed by the vendee only, is void by
the Statute of Frauds: De Beersi i v. Pai'ge 47 Barb.
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Construction and Validity.-The defendant executed an instrument,
by which, in consideration of one dollar, he agreed to purchase certain
real estate of the plaintiff, stock, &c., if satisfied with its location and
%dvantages, at a price specified, and in case no purchase should be made
then he agreed to pay the plaintiff $2000 for painting certain portraits;
and to pay him $50 per week for the board of himself and family dur-
ing three months specified. Held, on demurrer, 1. That the contract
was entire, and not severable; and that, being void as to the land, be-
cause not signed by the vendor, it was also void as to the other subjects
embraced therein. 2. That it was inoperative for want of mutuality.
3. That the consideration of one dollar, expressed in the writing, was
applicable to the sale of the real estate, and was vitiated by the pro-
vision of the statute which rendered that part of the instrument nuga-
tory and void: Id.
AMXNIENT.
Limitatio-.Pleading-W itnessed Note,-New counts by way of
amendment or addition to the declaration relate back to the commence-
ment of the suit, and operate as if they had been a part of the declara-
tion at the outset: Dana v. McClure, 39 Vt.
A plea to a new count on a witnessed note that the cause of action
did not accrue witin fourteen years next before "t1h e "f ing of the new
declaration," is bad on demurrer: Id.
The county court has authority to allow the plaintiff to file new counts
at any stage of the proceedings, even after his specifications have been
filed and the defemdant has pleaded, *and so pleaded as to defeat the
plaintiff, if limited to his original declaration. The exercise of this
authority is, *as to time, a matter of discretion not subject to revision by
the Supreme Court: Id.
The new count must be for the same cause of action which the suit
was originally brought to determine, but may set up that cause 'in such
a manner as to bring it -within the terms of a Statute of Limitations not
applicable to the original declaration: Id.
The plea, won accrevit infra sex annos, is a good answer to an action
of indebitatus assumpsit, and may not be avoided by a replication that
the action is brought to collect a witnessed note: .d.
But a new count, declaring specially upo a witnessed note while the
plaintiff had been seeking to collect under a general declaration, does
not set up'a new cause of action, although the statutory period of four-
teen years had elapsed before the new count was filed; and the plaintiff
may recover under his new count if fourteen years had not elapsed
before the suit was commenced: Id.
Nor does the new count revive or create by relation a cause of action.
The Statute of Limitations merely gives the debtor special matter of
defence to the remedy, it does not extinguish nor affect the indebtedness
which makes the cause of action: 'd.
The fact that the plaintiff could never have collected the debt if not
allowed to amend ib a reason for granting, not for refusing him leave to
file new counts: d.
- .ASSUMPSIT.
Book Account-P .ol Evidence to vary.-In assumpsit for balance
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for wagons alleged -to have been sold to the defendant, the plaintiff may
teslify that he intend.d to give credit to the defendant when he parted
with the wagons, although he charged them on his book to the defend-
ant's son : Fulsom. v. Skofteld, 53 Me.
Book Account- Ofset-Pajyment.-One item of the plaintiff's account
wa. for five days' work at $8.25. The defendant indorsed that sum as
fbr that five days' work, soon after the work was done, on a note for $10,
which he held against the plaintiff at the time the work was done, but
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
charged said work on book, supposing that it would be adjusted in their
mutual accounts. Held, that the defendant had no right to appropriate
:nd apply that item of work as payment on said note, and by such appli-
cation and indorsement defeat the right of the plaintiff to have it con-
stitute an item of charge in his running account with the defendant, and
to have it reckoned and embraced by the auditor in this suit on book:
(arr v. McDonald, 39 Vt.
The defendant borrowed of the plaintiff eleven pounds of nails, with
the understanding that the defendant was to pay for them in nails again,
which he never did, and the plaintiff never made any demand for them,
but charged them on book at the time they were borrowed-which was
about four years before this suit on book was brought, including said
nails as one item. rield, that the plaintiff could recover for the nails: Id.
BAILMENTS.
innkeeper as Bailee.-In 6ase against an innkeeper, the words, "being
entertained as a guest therein in the inn of the said" defendant, consti-
tute a sufficient allegation that the defendant was an innkeeper: Norcros.
. Norcross, 53 
Me.
The possession of a license does not make, nor the want of it prevent,
a person from being an innholder at common law: Id.
Innkeepers are insurers of the property of their guests committed to
their care, and are liable for, its loss or injury, when not caused by the
act of God, the public enemy, or the neglect or fault of the owner or
his servants: Id.
Upon proof of loss, the onus of bringing the case within the excep'
tions is upon the innkeeper: .d.
If a person 'goes to an inn as a wayfarer and traveller, and the inn-
keeper receives him as such, the relation of landlord and guest attaches
at once with all of its rights and liabilities, and so continues so long as
he sojourns there as a traveller: Id.
The liability of innkeeper attaches to goods when they are brought
within the inn or otherwise placed within his custody in some customary
and reasonable manner; Id.
If a guest, in the absence of the landlord and his servants, hang up
his coat in the place in an inn allotted for, that purpose, it is infra iws.
pitium: Id.
BrLLS AND NOTES.
Nature of the Oontrat-Parol Evidence.-When a negotiable promis-
sory note bears upon its back the names of the payee and another person,
-the former above the latter,--the presumption is, in the absence of all
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controlling proof, that the payee indorsed it to the one whose name is
under his, and the latter to some third party: ,Sturtevant v. Randall,
53 Me.
The contract implied, from one's placing his name in blank upon the
back of a negotiable promissory note, is not a written contract so far com-
plete in itself as to exclude parol evidence to show his connection with
such note: Id.
As between the original parties to such contract, or those having their
rights, parol evidence is admissible to prove the circumstances which
will determine its character: Id.
When a judgment has been rendered against a person upon the ver-
dict of a jury finding him to be an original promissor of the note in that
suit instead of an indorser, as he alleged himself to be in his specifica-
tions of defence, he is estopped to deny that relation in any litigation
with any other party to the note: Id.
Under a count for money had and received and money paid, a note
bearing on its back the defendant's name would be admissible under the
general issue: Id.
Notice to Indorser-Damages on Dishonor of Bill of Exchange on
London.-Tlf the notice to the indorser of the dishonor of a bill of
exchange is such that he must know what bill is referred to, it is suffi-
cient to charge him: Wood v. Watson, 53 Me.
Mercantile usage in this state has established the damages on a dis-
honored lill of exchange on London at ten per cent. : Id.
The coart cannot vary this rule, in q monetary crisis, on account of a
depreciation of the currency of the country. (DAvis, WALTON, and
BARROWS, JJ., dissenting): Id.
CONDITION.
Grant with Condition that Grantor shall have a Bomestead on the
Premises.-If a grant of a homestead is wade on condition "that the
grantor and his wife shall be allowed to reside on said homestead during
their respective natural lives, and so long az they thus reside thercoli
the grantee, his heirs and assigns, shall furnigh thcm with a comfortable
maintenance and support in sickness and in health, it being understood
that the grantee, his heirs and assigns, with their families, may also in
the mean time reside on said homestead," the grantee .has no right to
insist that the grantor or his wife shall become a part of his family or
receive their support at the table and in the apartments occupied by
him; and a refusal to furnish such support in a separate room will be a
breach of the cojdition: Bubbard v. Hubbard, 12 Allen.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA-w. -
Habeas Corpus-filitay Commissions.-Circuit Courts, as well as
the judges thereof, are authorized, by the fourteenth section of the
Judiciary Act, to issue the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of
inquiring into the cause of commitment, and they have jurisdiction,
except in cases where the privilege of the writ is suspended, to hear
and determine the question whether the party is entitled, to be dis-
charged: Exp arte Mldlligan, 4 Wallace.
The muai cuarse ef proceeding is for the court, on the application
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of the prisoner for a writ of habeas corpus, to issue the writ, and on its
return to hear and dispose of the case; but where the cause of imprison-
ment is fully shown by the petition, the court may, without issuing the
writ, consider and determine whether, upon the facts presented in
the petition, the prisoner, if brought before the court, would be dis-
charged: Id.
When the Circuit Court renders a final judgment refusing to dis-
charge the prisoner, he may bring the case here by writ of error; and.
if the judges of the Circuit Court, being opposed in opinion, can ren-
der no judgment, he may have the point upon which the disagreement
happens certified to this tribunal: Id.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, duly presented, is the institu-
tion of a cause on behalf of the petitioner; and the allowance or refusal
of the process, as well as the subsequent disposition of the prisoner, is
matter of law, and not of discretion : Id.
A person arrested after the passage of the Act of March 3d 1863,
"relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in cer-
tain cases," and under the authority of the said act, was entitled to his
discharge, if not indicted or presented by the grand jury convened at
the first subsequent term of the Circuit or District Court of the United
States for the district: Id.
The omission to furnish a list of the persons arrested to the judges
of the Circuit or District Court, as provided in the said act, did not
impair the right of such person, if not indicted or presented, to his
discharge: Id.
Military commissions organized during the late civil war, in a state
not invaded and not engaged in rebellion, in which the Federal courts
were open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their judicial
functions, had no jurisdiction to try, convict, or sentence, for any crimi-
nal offence, a citizen who was neither a resident of a rebellious state,
nor a prisoner of war, nor a person in the military or naval service.
And Congress could not invest them with any such power: Id.
The guaranty of trial by jury contained in the Constitution was
intended for a state of war as well as a state of peace; and is equally
binding upon rulers and people, at all times and under all circum-
stances : Id.
The Federal authority having been unopposed in the state of Indiana,
and the Federal courts open for the trial of offences and the redress of-
grievances, the usages of war could not, under the Constitution, afford
any sanction for the trial there of a citizen in civil life, not connected
with the military or naval service, by a military tribunal for any offence
whatever: Id.
Cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, in time of
war or public danger, are excepted from the necessity of presentment or
indictment by a grand jury; and the right of trial by jury, in such cases,
is subject to the same exceptions: Id.
Neither the President, nor Congress, nbr the Judiciary, can disturb
any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Consti-
tution, except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the
privilege of the writ of htbeas corpus: Id.
A citizen not connected with the military service and resident in a
state where the courts are open and in' the proper exercise of their
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jurisdiction, cannot, even when the privilege of the writ of habeas cor-
pus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced otherwise than by the
ordinary courts of law: Id.
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course; and, on
its return, the court decid'es whether the applicant is denied the right
of proceeding any further: Id.
A person who is a resident of a loyal state, where he was arrested;
who was never resident in an state engaged in rebellion, nor.connected
with the military or naval service, cannot be regarded as a prisoner
of war: Id.
CONTRACT.
Procuring Recruits for the United States Army a Legal Considera-
tion.-Services rendered for hire in procuring recruits and enlisting
them into the military service of the United States are not contrary -to
public policy, although the person rendering them has no interest,
except under his contract, in filling the quota of the town towards which
they are credited; and an action may be maintained to recover a sum
-agreed to be paid for such services: Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen.
CIUMINAL LAW.
Jaislaughte -Evidence-Delkrations 'of Deceased.-On the trial
of an indictment for manslaughter, committed in an affray, declarations
of the deceased made several hours after receiving the injuries from
which he died, though not made in view of approaching death, are not
admissible as evidence in favor of the defendants, for the purpose of
showing the circumstances of' the affray: Commonwealth v. Densmore
and Others, 12 Allen.
On such trial, the widow of the deceased identified the prisoners as
among the persons present at the affray. Held, that it was incompetent
to contradict her by evidence that her husband, in her presence, two or
three days after the affray, declared his ignoranc whq the parties were,
and that she made no reply: Id.
If in such case it appears that the affray occurred late at night, and
after the deceased had been called up out of bed, and the prisoners
contend that they went to his house for the purpose of getting liquor to"
drink, evidence is incompetent, on their behalf, to show that the de-.
ceased had frequently sold liquors late at night, and had been called up
for that purpose, without making objection: .d.
DRED.
Parol Evidence to explain eaning of Ambiguous Words.-A deed
conveys all the zinc and other ores, and excepts the ore called franklin-
ite: the complainant claims a vein of ores as passing by the name of
zinc; the defendants claim the same vein as excepted under the name
of franklinite. Held, that what was meant by the word zinc might be
explained by. evidence dehors the deed, and that under such evidence
the vein in dispute passed under the name of zinc: Y. J. Zinc Co. v.
Boston Franklinite Co., 2 McCarter.
To arrive at the true construction of the word "premises," as used in
this deed, it is competent fbr the court to resort to the previous written
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agreement between the parties, in fulfilment of which the deed was
made, to ascertain from that what the grantors intended to convey: Id.
EASEMENT.
Title to Ditch by adverse User.-The right to the use of a ditch
through the land of another, for the purpose of drainage, may be estab-
lished by adverse use: Whie v. Chapin, 12 Allen.
An actual use of such a ditch for that purpose for twenty years toge-
ther, if unexplained, will be sufficient to establish the right; and if there
is evidence of such actual use for that length of time, the question
should not be withdrawn from the jury unless there is clear proof that
it was not adverse: Id.
HABEAS CoRPus.-See Constitutional Law.
HIGHWAY.
Canal-Landowners along the Canal-Easement of Light and Air.-
The Morris Canal is a public highway. It is not the less a highway
because of the tolls, and by reason of its being. subject to the regulations
of the company: Barnet v. Johnson, 2 McCarter.
Owners of land adjacent upon the Morris Canal have the privilege of
receiving from it light and air; provided, in so doing, they do not inter-
fere with the most convenient use of the canal as a public highway, or
with any of 'the regulations of the directors made bond fide for that
purpose: Id.
The complainant owned a lot in the city of Newark, adjacent upon
the line of the Morris Canal, and built a house touching the line, with
windows facing the canal. .eld, that this court will restrain the defend-
ant, holding under the company, from erecting a building over the canal.
so as to shut up the complainant's windows: Id.
Towns-Latent Defects.-Towns are not insurers against all accidents
and injuries caused by defects in highways: Prindle v. Toin of
Fletcher, 39 Vt.
Towns are not liable for iatent defects in highways, that could not
have been avoided or discovered by the use of ordinary care and pru-
dence on their part: Id.
While the plaintiff was travelling over the defendants' highway, the
ground gave way under him through some latent defect under the
ground, which was not known or discoverable, and the plaintiff's horse
was injured. Held, that the defendant town was not'liable for tlie
injury: id.
.Evidence- Rebutting Testinon/- Collateral .is.e.-Where in an
action for' damages for an injury received on account of insufficiency
iu the highway, the defendants had introduced, as witnesses; two
of the selectmen of the town, who testified that they passed over the
highway in question, about twelve days after the injury was received,
and that there was no such defect as the plaintifis claimed:, it was held,
that the testimony, as to its condition, of one who passed over the road
two days after the injury was received, was admissible to rebut the testi-
mony of the selectmen, and could not then be excluded, even if it might
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be regarded as not competent in f he opening, upon the main issue:
Walker v. The Town of Westfield, 89 Vt.
But it is held, that such evidence would not tend to open a collateral
issue, but would be direct to the maerial issue in the case, and, there-
fore, if offered in the opening, it should be admitted by the court: 1d.
A fact that illustrates, as by an experiment, the condition of the
subject-matter of the issue in controversy, is not collateral to that issue,
but is direct evidence bearing upon it: Id.
The test is not whether the accident would have occurred indepen-
dently of such want of care, but whether such want of care and prudence
contributed in any degree, in point of fact, to the happening of the
accident: Id.
In order for a plaintiff to make a case upon whicla he may safely rest,
it is necessary that he should submit a state and character of evidence
upon which the jury would be authorized to find affirmatively, both that
the defect in the road operated to produce the accident, and that no
want of care on his part contributed to it: Id.
Where the plaintiff is chargeable with a want of the exercise of ordi-
nary care, it is proper to submit it to the jury, to find whether such
want contributed to the accident: Id.
Municial Corporation-Negligence.-The mere fact that a highway
is slippery from ice upon it, so that a person may be liable to slip and
fall upon it while using ordinary care, if the way is properly and well
constructed, and there is no such accumulation of ice or snow as to con-
stitute an obstruction, and nothing in -the construction or shape of the
way which occasions any special liability to the formation or accumula-
tion of ice upon it, is not a defect or want of repair which will authorize
a jury to find that it is not safe or convenient for travellers, within the
meaning of the statute imposing upon towns the duty to keep their ways
safe and convenient for travellers at all seasons of the year: Stanton v.
Springfield, 12 Allen.
INNKEEPER.----See Bailment.
JURISDICTION.
Controversy between Parties as to Land not in. the Jurisdiction of the
Court.-Complainants and defendants being joint owners of an island
in the Caribbean Sea, said to contain large quantities of guano, entered
into an agreement that complainants should conduct the business of col-
lecting and selling the guano for the mutual benefit of all concerned,
and that the profits and losses of the business should be divided among.
all the parties according to their respective interests; and that complain-
ants should have a lien on the island and all the. fiersonal property used
in their business for any advances made by them. The business gene-
rally proving unprofitable, the complainants filed their bill against the
defendants (who are citizens of this state, and appeared regularly to the
suit), praying an account and a decree against the defendants for their
proportion of the losses, and for a sale of the island, its contents, and
the personal property connected therewith. Beid, that it is no objection
to the court's 'aking an account and making a decree in the cause, that
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
the property is out of the jurisdiction of the court, so that the decree
cannot be enforced in rem: Wood v. Warner, 2 McOarter.
The strict primary decree of a court of equity is in personam, and
not in rem, and the authority of this court to deal with contracts in
relation to land not within the jurisdiction of the court is fully estab-
lished: 1d.
The contract between the parties, and the circumstances of the case,
held to be such as to entitle the complainants to close their operations,
and seek an account and settlement in this court: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
While the Statute of Limitations is a valid defence, yet when it is
apparent that neither of the parties considered that it had commenced
running, and both acted entirely upon a contrary hypothesis, there
should be so-ne hesitation in allowing it to prevail: Calanan v. Hc Clure,
Ext~tor. 47 Barb-
This rule should especially apply to the short Statute of Limitations,
which, unlike the other, is not a statute of repose, but is highly penal
and should be construed strictly: Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
De laraon-Pleading.-The essential ground of the action 'on the
case for a malicious prosecution, is the institution of proceedings against
the plaintiff in some court of law,'and without probable cause: Drew
v. Potter, 39 Vt.
That a legal prosecution has been commenced should appear affirma
tively in the declaration: 1d.
An averment of a charge and an arrest upon the charge, and an
acquittal after ten days' imprisonment, without any mention of any
court, justice, or prosecuting officer, any process, precept, or warrant,
and without profert of the record of any judicial tribunal, does not
amount to an averment of a prosecution or judicial proceeding, and a
declaration in case for a malicious prosecution containing no more is
insufficient: 1d.
The precedent for a second count given in 2 Chit. Pl. 611 is held
defective in substance: Id.
To make his pleading concise, simple, and accurate, the pleader
should allege with clearness and certainty all that is material, and
should omit to allege anything else: Id.
MISTAXE.
Icorrect Description of Premises in a Mortgage-Foreclosure and
Purchase by Person vnder the Inpression that he was buying the wolw
Tract-Remedy.-When a parcel of land is sold under a decree of fore-
closure, and is struck off and conveyed to the purchaser under an erro-
neous impression that the mortgage covers the entire tract, the price for
the entire tract being bid and paid, and the purchaser put into posses-
sion ; and it is afterwards discovered that, from a mistake in the descrip-
tion, the mortgage does not cover the entire premises intended to be
mortgaged, by reason whereof the legal title fails, the purchaser is enti-
tled to be protected in the peaceable possession of the land purchased:
Waldron v. Leson, 2 McCarter.
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Had an application been made on behalf of the mortgagee to reform
the mortgage prior to the date of foreclosure, there could have been no
doubt of his equitable title to relief. And if a mistake in a mortgage
may be corrected, it is just and equitable that the mortgagor should
abstain from availing himself of the mistake to the prejudice of the
purchaser: Id.
It is not gross carelessness in a purchaser at a sheriff's sale not to
know that a description in a sheriff's deed does not include the entire
premises, which are understood to be offered for sale: Id.
In this case the devisee of the mortgagor was restrained from pro-
ceeding by ejeetment, to recover the possession of that part of the pre-
mises accidentally omitted from the mortgage, and was decreed to release
the same to the purchaser: Id.
MORTGAGE.
How affected by an illegal Sale.-A sale of real estate under a pro-
ceeding which is afterwards pronounced to be illegal and invalid, cannot
operate to extinguish a valid mortgage, to satisfy which the sale was
made: ,Stackpole v. Robbins et al., 47 Barb.
The power of the mortgage is not exhausted by any such illegal sale;
and uppn the sale being vacated, the mortgage becomes as effective as
if no proceedings to set aside the sale had been had: Id.
The legal effect of a judgment setting aside a foreclosure and sale is
to vacate and annul all the proceedings, and to restore the mortgage to
its original position. The judgment 'does not destroy the lien of the
mortgage, which still remains in force; and new proceedings for fore-
closure and sale may be commenced by the mortgagee: Id.
Such new proceedings will not be restrained by injunction, at the suit
of a junior mortgagee, on the ground that the lien of the prior mortgage
is destroyed: Id.
MUNICIPAL CoRPOATIoN.-See Highway '
PAYMENT.
Uontract.-The rule recognised that a payment made upon an'existing
debt cannot be recovered back -by suit by the 'party making it, even
though judgment be taken and collected for the debt, without applyin g
and deducting said payment: Bronson v. Rugg, 39 Vt.
The defendant sold a lot of pelts for the plaintiff, and before the
defendant received the pay for them, the plaintiff told him that he, the
plaintiff, did not want the money for them, but wanted it applied on a
note which the defendant held against him, and the defendant said
"very well, or all right," but did not so apply it, and afterwards took a
judgment on the note and collected it in full, and the plaintiff then
brought this action for the pelt money. Beld, that if the defendant, on
receiving the money, had actually applied it as requested, it would have
become payment on the note; but having given it a different direction,
the understanding between the parties was not binding as an agreement
so as to make the money a payment on the note in spite of the defend-
ant's misappropriation of it: therefore the plaintiff was entitled to
recover: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
PLEADING.
Service of Writ.-Where a person serving a writ signed his return as
first constable, and the defendant pleaded in abatement, averring that
he was not first constable at the time of service, but did not aver that
he did not serve it in any other capacity than as first constable, the plea
was held defective: Smith v. Chase, 39 Vt.
. An addition to his name of the office and capacity in which he made
the service, would not be conclusive as to the official capacity in which
he made it: Id.
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH.
Time the Presumption begins.-The statute which raises a presump-
tion of the death of a person absenting himself for seven years without
being heard from, was designed to furnish a legal presumption of the
time-of the death, as well as of the fact of the death : Executors of
Clarke v. Canfield, 2 McCarter.
In the absence of the statute, the presumption would be that the absent
person is still alive. This presumption of the continuance of life only
ceases when it is overcome by the countervailing presumption of death
afforded by the statute, which is not until the end of seven years: Id.
The presumption of death which arises at the expiration of seven
years cannot operate retrospectively: Id.
RAILROAD COMPANY.
Responsibdiitfor Acts of Conductor.-A railroad corporation which
instructs its conductors not'to allow any person to ride in any freight
car attached to, their train, is responsible fbr the act of one of its con-
ductors in improperly putting a person off from a freight car while the
train is in motion: Rolmes v. Wakefield et al., 12 Allen.
Transportation of Live Animals.-It is the duty of a railroad com-
pany which undertakes to carry live animals for hire, to provide cars of
sufficient strength to prevent the animals from breaking through the
same; and they will be responsible for a loss occurring through their
failure to do so, although the animals were unruly and vicious; but they
will not be responsible for an injury to the animals occurring simply.
from their own viciousness or unruliness, while being carried in a proper
car: Smith v. N. EI. & N. Railroad Co., 12 Allen.
The rule of damages, in an action against a common carrier for a
failure to transport live animals to market and deliver them there in
good condition on a certain day, in accordance with his undertaking, is
the difference between their market value there in good condition on
the day when they ought to have been delivered, and their market value
there in their actual condition on the day when they were delivered: Id.
Land Damages-Title.-Where the owner of land across which a
railroad has been surveyed and located, consents that the contractors of
the road may proceed on the land before his damages are paid, and
under an agreement that they shall be subsequently ascertained and
paid, and the land is thereupon taken possession of by the railroad
company, and the road constructed over it, the title to the land passes.
and the owner retains no lien upon it for his damages; but must look
for payment to the party to whom he gave credit: knapp et al. v.
MAcAuley, 39 Vt.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. *
SHIPPING.
Bill of Lading-Demurrage.-If a bill of lading contains no pro-
vision for the payment of demurrage by the consignee, he is not liable
therefor, even upon his acceptance of the cargo; and certainly not, if he
assigns the bill of lading before any of the cargo has been delivered.:
Gage v. Morse, 12 Allen.
I SLANDER.
Damages.-Although slanderous words, charging theft, were spoken
in the presence of only a single witness, who testifies that they did not
affect his opinion of the plaintiff, and that he still believed the plaintiff
to be honest, yet, if the words were spoken maliciously, the jury are not
restricted to nominal damages: Markham v. Russell, 12 Allen.
STAMPS.
Omission to a&x- Validity of- Instrument.-Under the Act of Con-
gress, passed June 30th 1864, "To provide internal revenue to support
the government," &c., which enacts that any person who shall make,
sign, or issue any instrument, &c., or shall accept or pay any commercial
paper, without the same being duly stamped. or having thereon an adhe-
sive stamp to denote the duty chargeable thereon, with intent to evade
theprovisions of that act, shall forfeit the sum of $200, and such instru-
ment, &c., shall be deemed invalid and of no effect; the penalty is not
incurred unless the neglect duly to stamp be wilful and fraudulent; nor
is the instrument invalidated, unless the omission to affix a stamp be
"with intent to evade the provisions of the act;" in other words, to
defraud the government of the stamp duty, in whole or in part: Beebe
v. Eutton; 47 Barb.
It is "such" instrument, to wit, one that has been attempted to be put
in circulation by a fraudulent non-compliance with the terms of the act,
which is to be deemed invalid and of no effect, and not one which,
through haste, or inadvertence, or ignorance, has been mistakenly, though
honestly, issued without a compliance with the law : Id. *
When unstamped Instrziment may be read in -Evidence.-When the
question arises in a court of justice, and the point is distinctly presented,
whether an instrument defectively stamped without any intent to evade
the provisions of the revenue law, may be read in evidence upon proof
of those facts, accompanied by a distinct offer to comply with the provi-
sions of that act, and an actual compliance therewith, the Act of Con-
gress has not declared the instrument void; and, it is receivable in
evidence: .Id.
Where a chattel mortgage, upon being offered in evidence, is objected
to on the ground of its having a defective stamp, it is competent for the
party offering the instrument to show that the insufficiency of the stamp
arose from inadvertence or mistake, and without any intent to evade the
provisions of the revenue law, and thereupon to read the mortgage in
evidence: R[.
Power of Deputy Collector.-The duty of affixing a stamp to an instru-
ment when produced in court, and remitting the penalty, in the contin-
gency mentioned in the statute, was designed to be confided to the collector
in person; and he cannot devolve it upon a deputy, except in the event
of sickness or temporary disability: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
STATUTES.
Revision of Law-Breaking up of a Statute into Two-Effect upon
the Construction.-Where a statute, originally one, has its provisions
broken up by a revision of the law, and incorporated in two different
acts, the construction of these provisions cannot be affected by their
change of collocation: Clement v. Kaighn, 2 McCarter.
They are in par materia, and their construction must be the same as
if they remained as originally enacted, parts of the same statute: Id.
SURETY.
Liability of Surety of. a Public Officer for Money stolen from, his
Principal.-The loss of public money by a receiver and disburser of it,
through felonious taking away, though without fault on his part, does
not discharge him or his sureties from obligation on his official bond:
United States v. Dashiel, 4 Wallace.
Judgment against.-If a judgment is obtained against a surety, the
amount of it being fixed by a judgment previously ohtained against his
principal, the former judgment cannot be reversed on error as for an
amount too small, though the latter should be afterwards reversed as
having so been: United States v. Allsbury, 4 Wallace.
Conditional Signing of Bond apparently Comrplete.-A bond perfect
upon its face, apparently duly executed by all whose names appear
therein, purporting to be signed, sealed, and delivered by the several
obligors, and actually delivered by the principal without stipulation,
reservation, or condition, cainot be avoided by the sureties upon the
ground that they signed it on the condition that it should not be de-
livered unless it should be executed by other persons, who did not exe-
cute it, when it appears that the obligee had no notice of such condition,
and nothing to put him upon inquiry as to the manner of its execution,
and also that he has been induced upon the faith of such bond to act to
his own prejudice: State v. Peck, 53 Me.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Fraudulent Purchase-Right of Vendor to specific Lien on Goods
sold.-On a bill filed by a judgment-creditor against the debtor and
other prior judgment-creditors of the same debtor, alleging that the
debt for which complainant's judgment was entered was fraudulently
contracted by the debtor, in purchasing goods of complainant with
intent to subject them to the lien of execution of the complainant's
relatives having claims against him, and claiming that complainant is
entitled to have the articles so purchased specifically applied to the satis-
faction of his judgment, it was held, that complainant's case must rest
upon the ground of fraud in the purchase of articles from complainant
which vitiated the contract and prevented any change in the ownership
of the chattels; and that to sustain the. case upon this ground, the
articles must have been purchased with the purpose of defrauding
the complainant, or the credit must have been obtained by false and
fraudulent representations of material facts calculated to mislead the
complainant, and upon which he acted in the sale of the goods: Stouter-
burgh v. Konide, 2 McCarter.
